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 EMPLOYMENT POLICIES: A LESSON FROM AMERICA
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine the controversy surrounding the means by
which promises become binding in employment law. The dilemma is exposed in
the decisions of the courts in Taylor v Secretary of State for Scotland. 1   The
industrial tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal were prepared to accept
that entitlements could be created unilaterally:   “(t)he evidence was
that…..changes and additions to prison officers’ contracts were notified by
circulars …” 2  In the House of Lords, adherence to the orthodox contractual
model was so strong that their lordships felt that, in accepting the contractual status
of the equal opportunities policy, they were obliged to invent a finding of fact that
the notification was subsequent to a negotiated variation.3  The absence of
evidence of this assumed prior negotiation leaves exposed the de facto
acknowledgment of unilateral creation of contractual entitlements.   Such a
development poses questions about the jurisprudential nature of promises in
employment law and the rationale for their enforcement.
Taylor shows that English law may be ready to accept as contractual
unreciprocated promises.  This development will confront the courts with
conflicting values: first, the value rooted in the necessity to establish an
environment of orderly market transactions, in which certainty and fairness require
the performance of a promise freely volunteered;  and  secondly the value rooted in
the need to maximise the general welfare, which would permit management to
modify or revoke strategic or tactical policy statements should business conditions
so dictate.  It will be argued that the jurisprudence of many of the state jurisdictions
of the United States offers a more developed treatment of the enforcement of
policies, and it suggests a possible means by which the power of managerial
direction can be reconciled with the individualised version of justice which
demands that a promise be performed.
                                                          
1   [1997] IRLR 608, EAT; [1999] IRLR 363, Ct. of Sess.; [2000] IRLR 502, HL.
2   The EAT quoting from the decision of the industrial tribunal: [1997] IRLR 608 at p. 609.  
3  [2000] IRLR 503 at p. 504.
2 Managerial prerogative, which expresses the power of unilateral decision making,
is central to the employment relationship.  The duty to obey orders inherent in
every contract of employment is an expression of the subjection of the employee to
managerial control.  Any legal obligation binding management   to act subject to
the prior consent of an employee arises only in so far as contract   provides. In the
absence of such contractual limitations managerial prerogative concerning the
strategic and tactical direction of the business is, of course, untrammelled (except
for statutory constraints). Changes to working practices, the amendment of
promotion criteria, or the removal of non-contractual benefits, no matter how
fundamental to the working experience and expectations of employees,  can  be
effected by unilateral management action  if they are outside the scope of the
contract, and this is so even if the employees affected had been formally
encouraged  to expect the continuation of the status quo ante.
However, the increasing rigidification of the employment relationship has been an
evident characteristic of recent common law jurisprudence.  A common law
extension of contractual entitlements has been associated with the significant
expansion in implied terms, and in particular the implied duty to maintain trust and
confidence.4  This novel penetration of contract into the regulation of the working
environment is substantially concerned with the promotion of the dignity of and
respect for employees in the workplace and, less directly, with promoting
efficiency through enhanced morale and lower staff turn-over.5    This judicial
project also articulates a rejection of arbitrary, capricious, irrational or even
inefficient management decision-making, which again signals an indirect concern
                                                          
4  This is discussed by   Brodie  in The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence (1996) 25 ILJ
121. He persuasively argues that the idea of trust and confidence is wider than the courts' rhetoric suggests.
The terms implied in  Goold (Pearmark) Ltd. v. McConnell [1995] IRLR 516  and Scally v. Southern
Health and Services Board [1991] 4 All ER 563   perform a similar function to the duty to maintain trust
and confidence since they demand that employees be treated with respect and dignity.  These ideas are
central to  the trust and confidence duty.  We have also argued elsewhere that trust and confidence already
embraces some of the elements of a broader obligation to act in good faith: Hough and Spowart-Taylor,  A
Common Law Agenda for Labour Law, [1999] Web Journal of Current Legal Issues,
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/issue2/hough2.html.
5  Hough and Spowart-Taylor, loc. cit. These developments are not solely concerned with extending the
common law protection of employees. Management's power to defeat industrial action regardless of the
legitimacy or otherwise of the employees' claim has also been strengthened:  Secretary of State v. ASLEF
No.2  [1972] 2 All E. R. 949; Wiluszynski v. LB of Tower Hamlets [1989] ICR 493; BT v Ticehurst [1992]
IRLR 219.
3with enhanced management standards and more efficient enterprise.6   These
developments suggest some judicial  distaste for unbridled managerial power.
Thus, at the heart of the present debate concerning the scope of contract lie
concerns about setting appropriate limits to managerial prerogative. It is in this
context that the recent decision of the House of Lords in  Taylor  should be read.
The implications of its decision pose the controversial question: how far will the
courts  curtail the employer's legitimate interest in modifying policy statements,
codes of practice or other instruments for the guidance of decision makers, no
matter what their nomenclature?
Questions Posed by Taylor
In   Taylor an equal opportunities policy was held to be contractually binding,
ostensibly on the grounds that notification of the policy promise was itself
sufficient to create a binding obligation.  This leaves many questions unanswered.
The first relates to the nature of the obligation.  A "policy" normally provides a
commitment to a future course of behaviour identified from a number of possible
alternatives.  It is operated subject to the conditions  that prevail or can be foreseen
as likely to prevail at the time of its inception.  The continuation of this factual
context gives purpose to the policy; its absence renders the policy obsolete.  This
possibility of change in the underlying factual context suggests the fundamental
objection to rigidifying policy documents and elevating them to fully contractual
status. The global economic or commercial environment inherently poses for
enterprise an evolving matrix of fiscal, monetary, supply, demand and profitability
issues that mean that no policy guidance should be embedded beyond its
commercially useful shelf-life. The Taylor decision that such policies can acquire
contractual effects is made less compelling by its failure to propound any  problem
-solving device which might recognise not only the  shifting demands of
                                                          
6 There are numerous decisions of which the following are  examples: Associated Tyre v. Waterhouse
[1976] IRLR 386; British Aircraft Corpn. v. Austin [1978] IRLR 332;  Courtaulds Northern Textile v.
Andrews [1979] IRLR 84; Hilton International Hotels (UK) Ltd v. Protopapa [1990] IRLR 317; Goold
(Pearmark) v. McConnell [1995] IRLR 516; Smith v. Croft Inns Ltd. [1996] IRLR 84.
4managerial direction of the enterprise but also offer some protection of the
entitlement created by the employer's representation.
However,  not all policies are so dependent upon the flux of trade conditions and
this must provide a caveat to any objections to a further rigidification of the
relationship. Some policies merely express fundamental legal rights; only the detail
of their implementation is vulnerable to change. An employer is not at liberty to
revoke the obligation not to subject workers to unlawful discrimination, but may
wish   to alter, for example, the detail of the manner of implementation or the
targets by which success would be judged.  In contrast, revocation of a policy
governing promotion criteria engages fewer legal rights than an  equal
opportunities policy.7    In essence there may be some fundamental standards
which are right for permanent contractual status, whilst the case for other policy
guidance is less convincing.
 As we shall see, the United States courts have endeavoured to meet the objection
that employers should not be tied to anachronistic policies whilst also developing
some mechanisms to allow for the benefit formally held out by the employer to be
enforced. So far, however, this radical jurisprudence has been ventured without the
courts having reached an entirely cohesive doctrine.  Taylor prompts an
examination of the US experience to ask a number of fundamental questions: How
are enforceable entitlements identified? Does any binding promise become a
feature of the employee's contract that can be altered only bilaterally? Should the
policy be regarded as revocable only with consent unless the employer has
expressly reserved the power of unilateral revocation?   Alternatively, does the
contractual right attach to the policy only while the policy is in force, leaving the
employer free to revoke it with or without notice?     If unilateral revocation is
possible, would the courts tolerate revocation on any grounds?  Would it be
tolerable to allow a cynical employer to suspend unilaterally a commitment
formally offered in order that it could avoid the obligation it otherwise imposed
only to re-impose it subsequently?
                                                          
7   In relation to promotion an employee will have a right not to be treated arbitrarily or capriciously and to
have the criteria fairly applied: Post Office v. Roberts [1980] IRLR 347.
5The "Handbook Exception" in the United States
Courts in the United States have confronted the enforcement of promises in the
context of claims by employees to rebut the presumption that employment is 'at
will'.8 In such cases the employee seeks to enforce a commitment often made in a
formal policy statement, (perhaps a personnel manual or staff handbook) that the
employer will dismiss only for cause  (the so called 'handbook exception').9  In
arriving at the same conclusion to that reached by the House of Lords in Taylor the
Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan10
determined that such commitments could have contractual effects.11   It held that:
“1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not be
discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although the contract is not for a
definite term, and
2) such a provision may become part of the contract either by express agreement
…. or as a result of an employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an
employer's policy statements” (emphasis supplied).   
The second of these could suggest merely the waiver of the common law right to
dismiss “at will”. This is a very different matter from creating a general principle
by which unilateral declarations of policy become contractual.  However,  the
words “may become part of the contract” unequivocally conceptualise the
handbook exception within contract and not estoppel.      Thus, by its express
terms, Toussaint allows enforceable entitlements to arise from unilateral
managerial representations.  In this regard the ratio of the decision is directed at
                                                          
8   Employers at common law have a freedom to dismiss without notice and without cause: see further,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge etc.,(1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 1816 and
C. J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment, (1979) 40 Ohio St. L.J. 1.
9  It is, of course, possible that employees will seek to assert other benefits promised in personnel manuals.
These may be, for example, alleged contractual restrictions on dismissal: Morris v. Lutheran Medical
Centre 215 Neb 677, guarantees as to disciplinary procedures or pre-dismissal procedures: King v.
PYA/Monarch, Inc., 317 S.C. 385, 453 S.E.2d 885 (1995) or rules on holiday pay: Langdon v. Saga Corpn.
569 P 2d 524.
10  292 N.W.2d 880, 408 Mich 579, (Mich.) 1980.
11  The court reasoned that the 'at-will' doctrine was merely a rule of construction and placed no limitation
on the parties' freedom of contract:  292 NW 2d at p. 884.  The controversy concerns how contractual
obligations are formed in the exercie of that freedom.
6the common experience of industrial relations that not all policy statements emerge
from joint negotiating machinery, but instead from the unilateral expression of
managerial control. However, if consideration may be regarded as the price of the
promise,12 formal  policy statements issued after the formation of the contract of
employment appear to be gratuitous.13  How, after Toussaint, can their
enforcement be explained?14
 Four  solutions to the problem of reconciling Toussaint with orthodox doctrine
have been posed, although the Supreme Court of Michigan has had to concede that
                                                          
12  Pollock, Principles of Contract, (13th edition) at p. 133, approved in  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd.
v. Selfridges Ltd.  [1915] AC 847, at p. 855, per Lord Dunedin.
13  The ostensible absence of consideration has vexed the US courts as much as it ought to the English ones:
see e.g., Swain v. West (Butchers) Ltd. [1936] 3 All ER 261; Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.,197 Minn.
291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936); Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972).
14  The majority of other states also recognise a handbook exception: e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v
Campbell 512 So 2d 725 (Ala 1987); Leikvold v Valley View Community Hosp 141 Ariz 544; 688 P.2d 170
(1984); Chambers v Valley Nat'l Bank 3 IER Cases 1476 (Ariz 1988); Cleary v American Airlines 111 Cal
App 3d 443; 168 Cal Rptr 722 (1980); Brooks v Trans World Airlines Inc. 574 F Supp 805 (D Colo 1983)
(applying Colorado law); Continental Air Lines Inc. v Keenan 731 P.2d 708 (Colo 1987); Lincoln v
Sterling Drug Inc. 622 F Supp 66 (D Conn 1985) (applying Connecticut law); Green v Howard Univ 134
U.S. App DC 81; 412 F2d 1128 (1969); Kinoshita v Canadian Pacific Airlines 724 P.2d 110 (Hawaii
1986); Watson v Idaho Falls Consolidated Hosp Inc. 111 Idaho 44; 720 P.2d 632 (1986); Duldulao v St
Mary of Nazareth Hosp Ctr 115 Ill 2d 482; 505 NE2d 314 (1987); Allegri v Providence-St Margaret
Health Ctr 9 Kan App 2d 659; 684 P.2d 1031 (1984); Wyman v Osteopathic Hosp of Maine Inc. 493 A2d
330 (Me 1985); Staggs v Blue Cross of Maryland Inc. 61 Md App 381; 486 A2d 798 (1985) cert den 303
Md 295; 493 A2d 349 (1985); Toussaint supra; Pine River State Bank v Mettille 333 NW2d 622 (Minn
1983); Morris v Lutheran Medical Ctr 215 Neb 677; 340 NW2d 388 (1983); Southwest Gas Corp v Ahmad
99 Nev 594; 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Woolley v Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. 99 NJ 284; 491 A2d 1257 (1985)
modified on other grounds 101 NJ 10; 499 A2d 515 (1985); Forrester v Parker 93 NM 781; 606 P.2d 191
(1980); Weiner v McGraw-Hill Inc. 57 NY2d 458; 457 NYS2d 193; 443 NE2d 441 (1982). But see
Sabetay v Sterling Drug Inc. 69 NY2d 329; 514 NYS2d 209; 506 NE2d 919 (1987); Bolling v Clevepak
Corp 20 Ohio App 3d 113; 484 NE2d 1367 (1984); Smith v Teledyne Industries Inc. 578 F Supp 353 (ED
Mich 1984) (applying Ohio law); Langdon v Saga Corp 569 P.2d 524 (Okla Ct App 1976) (severance pay);
Vinyard v King 728 F2d 428 (CA 10 1984) (applying Oklahoma law); Yartzoff v Democrat-Herald
Publishing Co 281 Or 651; 576 P.2d 356 (1978); Wolk v Saks Fifth Ave 728 F2d 221 (CA 3 1984)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Small v Springs Industries Inc. 292 SC 481; 357 SE2d 452 (1987);
Osterkamp v Alkota Mfg Inc. 332 NW2d 275 (SD 1983); Hamby v Genesco Inc. 627 SW2d 373 (Tenn App
1981). But see Bringle v Methodist Hosp 701 SW2d 622 (Tenn App 1985); Smith v Kerrville Bus Co Inc.
709 F2d 914 (CA 5 1983) (applying Texas law). But see Reynolds Mfg Co v Mendoza 644 SW2d 536 (Tex
Civ App 1982); Piacitelli v Southern Utah State College 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) (educational
institutions); Sherman v Rutland Hosp 146 Vt 204; 500 A2d 230 (1985); Benoir v Ethan Allen Inc. 147 Vt
268; 514 A2d 716 (1986); Barger v General Electric Co 599 F Supp 1154 (WD Va 1984) (applying
Virginia law); Thompson v Kings Entertainment Co 653 F Supp 871 (ED Va 1987) (applying Virginia law);
Thompson v St Regis Paper Co 102 Wash 2d 219; 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Ferraro v Koelsch 124 Wis 2d
154; 368 NW2d 666 (1985); Mobil Coal Producing Inc. v Parks 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo 1985).
7'there is no clear consensus as to either the legal theory supporting the handbook
exception or the scope of the exception.' 15
(a)  the unilateral contract
 Many states, of which Wisconsin,16 Minnesota,17 Oklahoma,18 Connecticut19 (and,
for a time, Arizona20) are but examples, regard the employment contract not as an
ongoing contract but  as a series of unilateral contracts. The employee   accepts the
employer’s unilateral offer through their continued job performance.21  The new
policy benefit is formally conceptualised as a unilateral offer that is communicated
to the employee upon delivery of the new handbook or policy.   Acceptance of the
offered benefit by the employee occurs when they present themselves for work at
the next opportunity.  Consideration is identified in either the acceptance of
continued employment by the employee or as the provision of further
performance.22
The conceptualisaton of the employment-at-will contract as a unilateral contract
has been emphatically rejected by other states including Arizona, and doubted even
in Michigan where it was seen as "strikingly artifical".23  In Demasse v. ITT
Corpn.24 the Arizona Supreme Court indicated how vulnerable employees might be
                                                          
15  In re Certified Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting. Co 432 Mich 438, at pp. 448-449.
16  Ferraro v. Koelsch 124 Wis 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666  (1985).
17 Pine River State Bank v. Metille 333 NW2d 627 (1983).
18 Langdon v. Saga Corpn 569 P 2d 524.
19  Lincoln v Sterling Drug Inc. 622 F Supp 66 (D Conn 1985) (applying Connecticut law)
20  Chambers v Valley National Bank 3 IER Cases 1476 (Ariz 1988).
21    See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe,  722 P. 2d 250, 253 (1986).
22  Under the first alternative the failure to exercise the option of resignation is consideration:  Pine River
State Bank v. Metille 333 NW2d 627 (Minn, 1983); in the second, it is the continued performance of the
employee's duties: Langdon v. Saga Corpn. 569 P 2d 524.
23  In re Certified Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting. Co 432 Mich 438 at p.447. The Supreme Court
also reasoned that there will be doubts about when the act bargained for by the employer will be fully
performed unless the "act" is simply a days work. The artifice is that few employers and employees begin
each day contemplating fresh contractual negotiation.
24http://www.supreme.state.az.us/oop/qfullhit.htw?CiWebHitsFile=%2Fopin%2Fpdf99%2Fcv970177%2Ep
df&CiRestriction=Demasse&CiBeginHilite=%3Cstrong+class%3DHit%3E&CiEndHilite=%3C%2Fstrong
%3E&CiUserParam3=/query.asp&CiHiliteType=Full (1999)
8if such a model were adopted because it would mean that any entitlement the
employee had secured could be erased overnight.  It   stated in effect that it was
absurd to hold that employees who presented themselves for work the day
following the purported revocation of their contracts by the employer "would
manifest assent, constitute consideration, and permit cancellation of any
employment rights to which they were contractually entitled".25  If it were so, any
rights created by the handbook exception would be illusory.  The Supreme Court
of Michigan has also doubted whether unilateral contract adequately explains the
ruling in Toussaint.26
(b)  Reliance theory
Reliance theory provides an alternative explanation of contractual liability to that
of bargain theory.   The difficulty is that bargain theory fails to bind promisors to
formally volunteered but  unreciprocated undertakings  even where the promisee
has relied upon the promise. It offends one conception of justice if a promisor can
resile at will from a formal promise.  This is especially so where the promise is
made in the course of  a commercial relationship, a fortiori where the promisee has
reasonably relied upon the promise.  Such a difficulty invites a re-evaluation of the
theoretical rationale for the enforcement of promises by resort to a reliance model.
According to one reading of Toussaint  this explains the decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court to found liability, inter alia, upon a legitimate expectation  The
promise of job security is not purchased by the furnishing of additional
consideration by the employee because the duties of his or her post are likely to
remain unaltered.  The promise generates a legitimate expectation of performance
because it represents a formal commitment to the employee that inherently invites
the employee to rely on it.27  Thus reliance theory does not shrink from the
unilateral creation of binding entitlements.  Indeed in some states, such as Arizona,
                                                          
25  Ibid.
26  In re Certified Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting. Co 432 Mich 438 (Mich:1989).
27  Note, however, that in Toussaint,  408 Mich 579 at p. 613, the Supreme Court declined to hold that
Tousaint was required to adduce evidence of reliance.  Further, the court identified an enhancement in the
employment relationship to the benefit of the employer who chooses to make promises in policies.  This
finding hints at the existence of consideration as an explanation of the enforcement of the policy, but the
judgment does not state this explicitly. It does, however, obscure the theoretical foundation on the decision
in Toussaint.
9the handbook exception is explicitly explained in terms of reliance theory,
although at a practical level  the extent to which detrimental reliance is required is
uncertain.28   However, reliance theory is not universally accepted; some courts
instinctively adhere to bilateral explanations of contractual liability.   As we shall
see below, state courts in Michigan have endeavoured to modify the doctrine of
consideration rather than to abandon it.
(c)     Bargain Theory Re-Evaluated: Practical Benefit
Bargain theory places a value on reciprocity and holds that enforcement is justified
where performance has been purchased at the price of the promise. In Re Certified
Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting. Co29 the Michigan the Supreme Court
has  adopted the  technique of finding consideration in the practical benefit which
employers derive from issuing policies which formally promise benefits to
employees. 30   In  this decsion  the practical benefit was identified as follows:
The employer secures an orderly co-operative and loyal work force and the employee the peace of mind
associated with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.31
This reasoning was not innovative in Michigan for a similar approach can be
identified in the much earlier decision in Psutka v Michigan Alkali Co. 32 In this
case it was held that an enforceable right to claim death benefit was created even
                                                          
28  Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp 141 Ariz 544 (1984);  but see also Ferraro v. Koelsch 124
Wis 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666  (1985). In  Re Certified Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting. Co.  432
Mich 438, at p.  449 footnote 13 the court also explained Wyman v Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine Inc. 493
A2d 330 (Me 1985), Sherman v Rutland Hos. 146 Vt 204; 500 A2d 230 (1985)Vinyard v. King 728 F2d
428 (CA 10 1984),and Morris v Lutheran Medical Ctr. 215 Neb 677; 340 NW2d 388 (1983) as founded on
reliance theory.
29  432 Mich 438; 443 N.W.2d 112. (Mich. 1989)
30  Id. although if consideration is present, it is unclear as to how this can be reconciled with the decision in
Toussaint that liability is explained inter alia on the grounds of a legitimate expectation.  An even more
radical approach is to hold that consideration is but an evidentiary requirement  imposing a burden which
parties can satisfy with alternative evidence of mutual consent: Pine River State Bank v. Metille 333 NW2d
627 (Minn, 1983).
31   443 N.W.2d 112, 138-139, (Mich. 1989). See also Langdon v. Saga Corpn 569 P 2d 524.
32  264 N.W. 385 (1936)
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though the pension and death benefit plan stated that it was a purely voluntary
provision and constituted no contact and conferred no legal right on any employee.
This was so because '(a)mple consideration to support the death benefit plan as a
contract with the employees is found in the attraction of more competent workmen,
the inducement of better and more continuous service, and the avoidance of the
expense of labour turn-over.'
By this modified version of bargain the offer of a benefit, even in a policy
statement, can be supported by consideration.  Although it professes loyalty to
bilateralism, this only applies at formal level. The practical benefit contemplated is
not actually 'bargained for exchange, ' nor is it the 'price of the promise'.33  This
expanded version of the doctrine of consideration only thinly disguises an
acceptance of the unilateral creation of contractual entitlements.
(d)  Obligations within the penumbra of contract.
A  more innovative  theoretical foundation of the handbook exception also lies in
both Toussaint and In re Certified Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting. Co  
In these cases the court  alternatively declared that the exception is not established
by any of the traditional means of forming contracts.34  Instead  contractual
obligations are created from a source that is merely 'instinct with obligation'.  The
obligation so described seems to be one that has many of the characteristics of
contract, especially in the manner of in which it takes effect, but its creation is
novel.
The benefit to the employer of promoting .... an environment (enhanced by commitments to the employee)
rather than the traditional contract-forming mechanisms of mutual assent or individual detrimental reliance
gives rise to a situation "instinct with an obligation." 35
                                                          
33 Pollock, loc. cit.
34  This was also buttressed in Toussaint by the ruling that there need be no negotiation of the policy in
order for it to bind; indeed it was unimportant that the employee was ignorant of the policy: see below n. 36.
35  Id. at 447-448. This explanation was was followed inter alia in Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan,
432 Mich 472, 480; 444 NW2d 114 (1989). and has recently been affirmed in the judgment of the
Michigan Court of Appeals in Betts v. Butterworth Hospital Dec 17th 1999,
http://www.michbar.org/opinions/
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 The ambiguity of this instinctively recognised obligation appears to confuse an
'ought' with an 'is'.  It signals a policy preference for binding employers even if
orthodox principles cannot be stretched sufficiently to provide a clear doctrinal
basis for doing so.
(e) Summary.
The State jurisdictions have yet to explain satisfactorily the doctrinal basis for the
handbook exception. We have seen that at least four rival theories co-exist within
the jurisprudence.  However, we shall also see that in identifying particular
promises within policy statements for enforcement the courts arguably favour the
reliance model.
The probable conclusion from the substance of this doctrinal experimentation is
that it legitimates the unilateral creation of rights and that this in substance flows
through each of the four alternative models. It is explicitly so in the cases of the
unilateral theorists, as well as some versions of reliance theory, and the penumbra
theory.  The expanded version of consideration professes bilateralism but within a
version of contract in which bilateral negotiation and a 'meeting of minds' is
conspicuously absent.36   If unilateral creation is acknowledged, how may the
entitlement so created be modified or extinguished?  This will be considered
below.
The theoretical foundation of enforcement in English law.
As in the United States, a significant objection to the enforcement of benefits
extended to employees through policy statements is that they ostensibly appear to
lack mutuality, which raises the possibility that the promise to confer the benefit is
nudum pactum. A full analysis of the developments in English jurisprudence  falls
                                                          
36  For an employment policy to bind it was held that "(n)o pre-employment negotiations need take place
and the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of
the particulars of the  employer's policies.....,"  Toussaint, 408 Mich 579  at p. 613.  The possibility of
creating unnegotiated entitlements was also accepted in Bullock  v.  Automobile Club of Michigan, 432
Mich 472, 480  (1989) and followed in Betts v. Butterworth Hospital  Kent Circuit Court, Dec 17th 1999,
see note 35 above.
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beyond the scope of this article.   However, a distinction should be made between
the example of the employee who accepts an offer of employment after the policy
has been promulgated and that of the employee who is confronted by a policy
subsequent to the contract of employment.  In the former case there is no objection
to enforcing any “apt” commitment made in the policy since the employee has
furnished consideration for it just as for any other benefit offered by the employer.
It is different in the case of the employee whose contract is concluded prior to the
introduction of the new policy because in the absence of some reciprocal exchange
the promise to confer the benefit is ostensibly gratuitous.37   
In summary, the answer to this objection is that   the courts have, in English
employment law, broadened the concept of valid consideration. In doing so they
have constructed a version of consideration that is strikingly similar to that of the
third technique (bargain theory/practical benefit) adopted by the US courts.
Employers who extend benefits to employees in formal policy statements do so in
pursuit of self-interest and not for altruistic reasons.  Indirect benefits flowing
from the enhancement of the employment relationship include the expectation on
the part of the employer of lower staff turnover and higher staff morale where
employees believe that they are treated fairly and valued. The recent decision of
the Court of Appeal in Edmonds v Lawson,38 confirms this shift in English
jurisprudence in deciding that an unremunerated pupil barrister has a contractual
relationship with her chambers, the consideration for which lies in the benefit the
chambers acquires from attracting talented pupils.  This is not an unexpected
development after Williams v Roffey Bros. Ltd.39, a fortiori in a context in which a
significant value is attached to continuing the relationship between the parties.   It
is also consistent with a version of consideration articulated by Corbin who argued
that consideration  'need not be the object of the promisor's desire for which he
offers his promise in exchange, but may instead be an action or forbearance by the
promisee as a result or natural consequence of the promise.  All that is required is
there that there should, between the promise and the consideration, be a causal
connection'.40
                                                          
37  Swain v West (Butchers) Ltd. [1936] 3 All ER 261.
38  [2000] IRLR 319 CA.
39   [1990] 2 WLR 1153.
40  A L Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration?-Recent Noteworthy Decisions, 27 Yale
L.J. 362, 366.
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In sum the revised version of the doctrine of consideration permits the enforcement
of entitlements contained in formal policy statements.  The subsequent issue is to
identify which entitlements   the courts will enforce?
Identifying an enforceable entitlement
It has already been observed that a policy is normally regarded as a flexible
framework for operational guidance; by its very nature it lacks the characteristic of
permanence. But Taylor and Toussaint hold that policy commitments can become
permanent components of the contract of employment. Which entitlements are
suitable for such treatment?
If there is an appropriate analogy with collective agreements, the courts will
incorporate into contracts those entitlements that are 'apt' for incorporation. 41
However, such a test merely poses the further question of what makes an
entitlement 'apt' for elevation to contract?
In the United States the jurisprudence is in a more developed condition in the
context of the handbook exception.   A promise “apt” for incorporation into the
contract is one which generates a legitimate expectation. Toussaint, and the
subsequent decision in Rood  v. General Dynamics Corp.,42 decide that this
conclusion derives from a two stage process.  There must be a consideration of
what the employer has promised and whether that promise was reasonably capable
of creating a legitimate expectation of the entitlement claimed.    In  Rood  the
court defined a promise  as  a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify the promisee in understanding that
a commitment has been made.43  Hence it is the objective commitment made to the
employee which is the sine qua non of enforcement.  If the employer retains a
                                                          
41  Alexander v. Standard Telephones and Cables plc [1990] ICR 291 upon which reliance was placed in
Wandsworth LBC v D'Silva, see n. 56 below.
42    444 Mich. 107 (Mich. 1993).
43   See also Adkins v. American Axle & Manufacturing Inc., Wayne Circuit Court, Aug 3 1999
http://www.michbar.org/opinions/
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choice whether or not to act in a specified way, no promise is created. 44  Policy
statements  and, especially, oral statements,  have to offer a "clear and
unequivocal" statement of job security.45  A high degree of 'specificity' is
required.46  The more indefinite the terms of a policy or statement, the less likely it
will be that the employer will be found to have made a promise to the employee.47   
Statements which have an aspirational quality, such as  "an expression of an
optimistic hope of a long relationship"48 will not create a contractual obligation.
This strikes a parallel with English law, most noteably Grant where the judge
justified non-enforcement of an equal opportunities policy inter alia on the grounds
that it was “idealistic”. 49  Additionally, in the US a specific disclaimer in the
policy statement that no enforceable rights are to be created  is conclusive proof
that a commitment sufficient to sustain a legitimate expectation was absent.50
The treatment of policies in English law.
The limited English jurisprudence on the enforcement of policies substitutes
'intention' for the US standard of 'commitment'.  The difference is that 'intention'
invokes the traditional bilateralism of the mutual meeting of minds and thus differs
markedly from the unilateralism of 'commitment'.   Since intention must be
ascertained by objective means the courts look for evidence other than the
employer's subjective motivation.   Evidence of objective intention can be found
not only in the language of the putative policy obligation   but also in the manner
in which the policy was   promulgated.  Grant v SW Trains Ltd.51 concerned the
                                                          
44   Rood v. General Dynamics Corp., 444 Mich. 107, at pp.138-139.
45  American Axle, http://www.michbar.org/opinions/  Highstone v Westin August 9th 1999,
http://www.michbar.org/opinions/
46  Highstone, id. Note  a parallel development in English law in English v. Unison Rhyll County Court
case MA810294, IDS Brief 668, Sept. 2000 where a provision in a "guide" given to a member on joining
the union created a contractual entitlement because of, inter alia,  the certainty of the language. This
expressly referred to a "right" having been created.
47  See for example, American Axle http://www.michbar.org/opinions/, following Rood 444 Mich. 107 at p.
139.
48  Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 437 Mich. 627, 473 N.W.2d 268, 273-75 (Mich. 1991); Highstone v.
Westin August 9th 1999 http://www.michbar.org/opinions/
49  Grant v. SW Trains Ltd.at [1998] IRLR 188 at p. 189.
50  Lytle v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1998).
51  [1998] IRLR 188.
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unsuccessful attempt to enforce an equal opportunities policy containing an
express commitment by the employer not to discriminate on the grounds of sexual
orientation.  The court identified the absence of the necessary intention as the key
factor in denying the liability of the employer.52 This absence was identified by an
examination  of: (i) the process by which the document was promulgated; (ii) the
language in which the possible obligations were framed; (iii) the formal status of
the document; and (iv) the relationship of the possible obligations with the express
terms of the contract.   These tests closely mirror the approach in the United States.
However, the weight to be attached to them is markedly different. In Grant  Curtis
J. was much influenced by the status of the document in which the alleged promise
was enshrined. As this was clearly a policy document, he found that this was  of
itself incompatible with the intention to create legal relations. In the United States
this is not  a conclusive factor, nor one which appears to receive much weight.
The more significant criterion is whether, notwithstanding its formal status, the
employer can be understood to have made the necessary commitment to the
employee.
But this did not conclude the matter because his lordship continued to  consider the
language in which the parties' actual intention was expressed, and found the
putative obligation expressed as a "concession" in "very general, even idealistic
terms".53  The emphasis upon 'concession' signals a disinclination to bind an
employer to unbargained for promises and seems to draw upon a classical version
of consideration which the Court of Appeal abandoned in Edmonds v Lawson.54
This also signals a more conservative approach than has been evident in the United
States.
 In Grant his lordship also considered the manner in which the policy had been
promulgated within the employer's organisational structure.  Because such
obligations usually emanated from a joint negotiating machinery and not from the
                                                          
52  However, there would presumably be a contractual duty to apply a policy consistently; any failure in this
regard might breach the implied duty to maintain trust and confidence: Gardner v Beresford [1978] IRLR
63.
53  The policy stated, inter alia,  "We are committed to ensuring that all individuals are treated fairly and
are valued irrespective of disability, race, gender, health, social class, sexual preference, marital status,
nationality, religion, employment status, age, or membership or non-membership of a trade union."
54  [2000] IRLR 319 CA.
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employer acting outside that machinery there was found to be further evidence that
promissory intention was absent. This also reflects a strong preference for a
bilateral model where obligations result from some process of offer and
acceptance. This is another feature of the judgment that has been abandoned in the
United States.   Finally his lordship examined other promises as indicators of the
intended meaning of the policy.  He found that the policy conflicted with the
express words of the contract of employment.  Loyal in this regard to classical
theory, he concluded that any implied term (sic) could not prevail over a
conflicting express term. The possibility of variation was not accepted.
In sum, whilst Grant, in examining the question of intention, appears to draw upon
factors similar to the Michigan authorities, it betrays a radically different and more
traditional approach.  There is an instinctive trust in bilateralism and a sub silentio
concern about the absence of consideration.  In refusing to go beyond the formal
character of the document his lordship was obviously reluctant to convert a  policy
statement, the very idea of which is infused with a lack of permanence and, hence,
a power to revoke,  into  a fixed component of the employees' contracts of
employment.  But in doing so the court arguably gave insufficient weight to the
point that the employer had manifestly made a formal commitment to equal
opportunities which it had not chosen to revoke. In other words the judge may have
been influenced to deny contractual status to the policy simply through a desire to
preserve the power to revoke or amend and did not give sufficient weight to the
argument that the employer could be bound by a promise which it had not actually
revoked or amended.   In refusing to consider this point Grant in effect treated the
promissory words as illusory.
In Wandsworth LBC v D'Silva55 the dispute concerned the employer's decision to
reduce the period of sickness absence before which a review of an absence record
was triggered.  In contrast to Grant, the court was less influenced by the source of
the alleged obligation (an internal 'code of practice') and placed a greater emphasis
not only upon the language in which it was expressed but also the industrial
context in which the policy would operate. Its introductory paragraph described the
code as a "framework" for the guidance of managers. The code continued to state
                                                          
55  [1998] IRLR 193.
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that discussions over sickness absence between management and sick employees
were an industrial desideratum and acknowledged that flexibility is required in
dealing with the divergent range of circumstances surrounding sickness absence.
The Court concluded that good industrial practice would regard those parts of the
statement affecting reviews of absence to be unenforceable. Supervisors were not
being directed as to what was contractually obliged to happen in dealing with
sickness cases;56 instead the code provided guidance encapsulating a desirable
choice of possible conduct which itself would ensure that in the range of different
circumstances surrounding sickness absence there was room for compassion as
well as rigour.  This is consistent with US jurisprudence in which the retention by
the employer of a discretion as to outcomes negates the creation of an enforceable
right.57   However, counsel conceded that the parts of the code which dealt with
appeals were binding, inter alia, because the code described these as 'appeal
rights'. This also reveals the emphasis that the language of the code received in the
Court of Appeal.
The decision of the House of Lords in Taylor provides no further guidance as to
the approach of the English courts.  After losing the point before the EAT, the
employer in the Court of Session  conceded that the policy was contractual, and in
the House of Lords  the case was resolved simply by construing the contract.  Their
lordships were not required to address the complex issues which follow from the
conclusion that the policy created a contractual right.
In conclusion, in seeking to identify contractually binding promises  the English
courts, in contrast to those in the US, seek to identify the mutual intention of the
parties rather than the narrower issue of whether an objective commitment has
been made by the employer.  The fact that the alleged obligation emanates from a
policy rather than a source having more obvious contractual potential58 seems (if
Grant is good law) to weigh heavily against contractual status because the
                                                          
56  The court stated that good industrial practice required a more sophisticated analysis than the invocation
of penalties after a given number of days' absence.  For example, an employee claiming to be ill and absent
for one day who was found shopping in a town centre should be treated differently than an asthma sufferer
genuinely absent for a number of days.  The need to preserve this flexibility was a powerful argument
against finding that the provisions had contractual effects.
57  Rood v. General Dynamics Corp., 444 Mich. 107.
58  Such as a collective agreement.
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judiciary appear to be troubled by rigidifying what might properly be described as
operational guidance rather than a permanent undertaking. There is evidence of an
adherence both to a bilateral model as well as an instinctive reaction against
enforcing promises for which there appears to be no direct quid pro quo
('concessions').
In contrast in the US  the absence of direct exchange   does not preclude a promise
made in a policy statement from having contractual effect. Moreover, the source of
the obligation is treated as subordinate to the question of whether the employer
was making a commitment to act or refrain from acting  in a specific way
thereafter.  If in Grant the court had focused  upon the clear commitment made by
any employer who takes the formal step of declaring an equal opportunities policy,
it is possible that the decision might have been  different.  Admittedly the
reasoning in D’Silva  more closely resembles  that in the United States in the
emphasis it places on the language of the document; but the negotiated origins of
the code in D'Silva clothed it in a bilateralism which removed some of the
concerns expressed in Grant.   Had the code been issued unilaterally it is  possible
that the concession regarding even appellate 'rights' would not have been made
since the ostensible absence of consideration might have placed the case in a closer
relationship with Grant.    One reading of D'Silva thus supports the argument that
English courts remain  more likely to enforce appropriate parts of bilateral rather
than unilateral instruments.
What entitlement derives from an enforceable policy statement?
If the courts find that a commitment made in a policy statement does have
contractual status, what effect does this have? The possible choices are that the
employer may modify or revoke: at will, with notice, with notice only on specified
grounds,  or only with the employee’s consent.    So far the English courts have not
been required to address this question.
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At the heart of the problem lies the tension between rights and efficiency.   To
what extent, if at all, can these divergent policy imperatives be reconciled?
In the United States in the context of the handbook exception this issue has been
the subject of much debate. It is proposed to examine below the two contrasting
models that have emerged from the jurisprudence. The first derives from
Michigan, and has been dubbed "the administrative model";59 the second results
from a decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona that adopts a more orthodox
bilateral model.  These two models have been chosen because in substance they
identify the fundamental choice which the English courts may confront.
 At the heart of the problem which each jurisdiction has had to address lies the
uncertain jurisprudential basis of the handbook exception in the Toussaint case.
This is of central importance to the question of revocation or modification of the
policy because there is a logical argument that, if the obligation is unilaterally
created,   revocation could also be possible as a unilateral exercise of managerial
power, whereas bilateralism would insist on modification only with consent. It is
also, in the context of reliance theory, unclear what the legitimate expectation is.
What entitlement derives from it?  In particular, is it an entitlement that trumps
efficiency in all circumstances?
It is true that most states have a handbook exception similar to that in Toussaint.
They accept that a commitment made to the workforce in a staff handbook or
policy statement can give rise to a contract.  As indicated above there is little
theoretical agreement as to how this is so.   Accordingly, on the vital questions
touching upon the amendment or revocation of the policy  the jurisdictions of the
various states diverge.   In Michigan the Supreme Court has come to recognise, as
did his lordship in Grant, that efficiency arguments weigh heavily against locating
policies and statements, no matter how formally and sincerely they express a
commitment to the employees, within a traditional and fixed contractual
environment. The argument which favoured the creation of an individualised
entitlement upon which an employee could insist even in the face of a legitimate
                                                          
59  H. H. Perritt Jnr, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, § 4.44 (3d ed. 1992).
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business interest was outweighed by the opposite view that an entitlement should
not become a permanent feature of the employment contract modifiable only after
successful negotiation with each individual employee.60 Employers should not be
tied in perpetuity to anachronistic policies, nor should they be forced to operate a
variety of different policies which must inevitably result if each individual
employee had the right to veto change: some might consent to change, others
would not, and employers would find themselves in a confusingly complex
position as they became obligated in different ways to the respective members of
the workforce.   But the court also recognised that employers who freely choose to
issue policy commitments do create legitimate expectations of performance and,
under Toussaint, these can become contractual. Given that this is so, how could
those entitlements be modified or rescinded except by bilateral means?
The Supreme Court of Michigan has endeavoured to address this conundrum by
interpreting the concept of the legitimate expectation that Toussaint introduced.  It
decided that any legitimate expectation deriving from a non-permanent policy was
not an expectation that the policy should last indefinitely, nor that it should be
immutable. Three principles were therefore constructed in  Re Certified Question,
Bankey v Storer Broadcasting. Co:
  (i) because a policy with no fixed duration cannot be expected to endure
perpetually, the employer must have (under the power of managerial direction) the
implied right to rescind or modify the policy. This means that the employer must
abide by its terms only whilst the policy is in force.61 The legitimate expectation is
that the policy will be applied consistently and fairly throughout its duration. The
practical consequence is that where an employer has chosen voluntarily to issue a
commitment to the employees the employees have a contractual right to expect
performance of that obligation until the policy is revoked or varied.   The  second
principle is a consequence of the first;
                                                          
60  In re Certified Question, Bankey v Storer Broadcasting. Co.  443 N.W.2d 112, 138-139, (Mich. 1989)
61  Note that in this respect the court was following its earlier obiter opinion in  Toussaint at pp.614-615
that the right of unilateral modification applies even if the policy entitlement is contractual.   However
Toussaint stipulated that notice would not be required.
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(ii) after serving reasonable notice the employer retains the power either to revoke
or to modify the policy unilaterally. This may be done without reserving an express
power to do so in the terms of the policy itself although such an option remains
open to the employer;
(iii) the third principle rejects an unfettered power to revoke or vary policies which
otherwise create rights.  The court will not countenance revocation in bad faith.
This means that the employer can revoke only in pursuit of legitimate business
reasons, although the scope of this is uncertain.62  However, this limitation has
signalled at least a minimum substantive duty to act fairly.
The third principle is intended to address cynical evasion or manipulation of the
implied right of amendment or revocation.  This was necessary because the
Supreme Court was aware of the obvious loop-hole that (i) and (ii) together
created.  In an extreme case the cynical employer   could have revoked the promise
of job security,  dismissed an employee without cause immediately afterwards only
to re-instate the policy once the employee had cleared their desk and left the
premises.      Accordingly, the court imposed safeguards intended to restrict the
employer’s power to misuse the managerial prerogative that principle   (ii)
preserved.
In conclusion, the Michigan solution departs from the absolute all-or-nothing
approach of Grant which holds that managerial power can only be preserved by
denying contractual effects to the policy. Michigan states that the policy binds
while it is in force but the employer, after reasonable notice, has a power of
unilateral modification or revocation.  The service of notice affords the employees
process rights, and the restriction on the employer acting in bad faith allows the
court at least some minimum substantive control against abusive manipulation of
managerial powers. In effect, Michigan recognises management's claim for
directorial bureaucratic power, but it sees no reason why this should not be
tempered with a respect, albeit somewhat limited,  for individual rights.
                                                          
62  It is not clear whether, for example,  this burden is discharged by the honest belief that the change is
commercially desirable, or a more objective assessment that revocation would in fact generate a commercial
advantage.
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However, the Michigan approach is not universally supported.   The Supreme
Court of Arizona recently rejected any doctrine of unilateral modification of
contractual entitlements.63  It adhered strictly to orthodox principles by holding
that for any modification or revocation of a policy binding under Toussaint there
must be "(1) an offer to modify the contract, (2) assent to or acceptance of that
offer, and (3) consideration.  Continued employment after the issue of the
replacement policy would not furnish sufficient consideration." The Supreme
Court emphasised the point further:
"Consideration will be found when an employer and its employees have made a
“bargained for exchange to support [the employees’] . . . relinquishment of the
protections they are entitled to under the existing contract.” 64
It reasoned that the administrative model pursued in Bankey was unsatisfactory
because employees wishing to preserve their legal rights after  receiving notice of
a proposed unilateral change in their contracts would have no option but to resign.
 Employers wishing to avoid the consequences of Toussaint were held to have a
duty to protect their own interests by inserting an express reservation that no
contractual rights were created.  This possibility was held to afford employers
sufficient protection enabling them to avoid being tied to outmoded policies.  The
employer who omits to do so was found to induce reliance on the terms of the
policy and could not thereafter revoke or modify it by unilateral means.
 The essential difference between the "administrative model" in Bankey   and the
orthodoxy of Demasse is that in the latter the employee acquires a substantive
entitlement to the performance of the contractual obligation.  The Arizona model
demonstrates a greater concern with security of the “transaction” than that in
Michigan.  It respects the consequences of the bilateral model which is that the
employee has a right to withhold consent to rescission or modification of the
                                                          
63 Demasse v ITT Corporation, above n.24. This was so even though the entitlement was created
unilaterally.
64  Demasse, above n.24, citing Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 682 N. E. 2d 68, 72 (Ill. App. 1997), aff’d 708
N. E. 2d 1140, 1999 WL 77557 (Ill.).
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policy. This means that the relevant parts of the policy can become a permanent
component of the contract of employment. In contrast, in Bankey  the emphasis is
upon bureaucratic process rather than substantive entitlements:    the employer can
merely revoke the policy for bona fide reasons after service of reasonable notice.
Demasse and Bankey fundamentally delineate the dilemma that may come to face
the English courts: does the employer have a limited power of unilateral
modification or not?  The alternatives available to English courts are substantially
presented in the Michigan and Arizona jurisprudence.   What would  the effect be
in English law if the courts were to follow either of those alternatives?
Foreshadowing   Developments in the English Common Law.
If the English common law developed in a manner similar to the Arizona model, it
would mean that orthodox principles of the law of contract would govern policy
benefits incorporated into the contract of employment.  Unless the employer
adopted the straightforward expedient of reserving an express power to do so in
the terms of the policy, it could not be varied or revoked without the consent of the
individual employee.  This possible development has actually been predicted by
developments in the implied term of trust and confidence. In French v. Barclays
Bank plc65 the revocation of a promise that a discretionary bridging loan should be
interest free was a breach of contract as conduct likely to destroy trust and
confidence.
This means that, if, in English law, an employer breached the binding terms of the
policy the employee could elect to treat the contract as continuing and sue for
damages representing the value of the lost benefit,66 or elect to terminate the
contract and sue for damages for breach or unfair dismissal.  If the benefit
                                                          
65  [1998] IRLR 646.
66   Rigby v. Ferodo Ltd. [1987] IRLR 516.
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unilaterally revoked related to wages   a claim would lie to an employment tribunal
under Part II of the Employment Rights Act 1996.67
In contrast, the Michigan administrative model would endow the policy with
contractual effects only until the expiry of the employer's  lawful notice to amend
or rescind it.  During the policy's life the common law remedies would be available
for breach, but after the service of notice the entitlement would evaporate.   The
only caveat might be that if the employer acted in bad faith there could be an
independent action for a breach of the implied duty to maintain trust and
confidence.   An employee wishing to preserve his or her rights under the contract
would be forced to resign before the employer's notice had taken effect and to
bring an action for damages at common law.   However, this remedy would
normally be of little value since the damages would be limited to wages that would
have been paid during the period of contractual notice.
However, this does not conclude the issue because repudiatory breaches of
contract are also mediated as claims for unfair constructive dismissal.  It is argued
that, regardless of which  alternative  the English courts adopt, the practical
differences in the protection afforded to employees in this respect will be slight.
This is so because of the superiority of  process over substantive rights in the
English law of unfair dismissal. Even if the courts adopted the Arizona model,
with its emphasis upon contractual rights, the English employee would,
nevertheless, be vulnerable to their unilateral revocation.  This is so because there
are slender substantive limitations on when contractual rights can be overridden;
the real protection for employees lies in the process rights afforded by unfair
dismissal. This predominance of procedural over substantive controls, although
derived from statute, closely resembles the Michigan administrative model.
                                                          
67  By Employment Right Act 1996, s.27 "wages" are defined, inter alia, to  mean "any sums payable to the
worker in connection with his employment, including-
(a) any fee, bonus, commission, holiday pay or other emolument referable to his employment, whether
payable under his contract or otherwise".  The italicised words (emphasis supplied) indicate that a claim
will lie to an Employment Tribunal in respect of wages or benefits promised in a policy statement or
handbook even if the promise is found to be non-contractual.
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 The provision in the Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 98 (1) (b) that the employer
may justify a dismissal for "some other substantial reason" (SOSR) makes
significant concessions to managerial prerogative and subordinates contractual
entitlements. For example, the employer who can   demonstrate that a decision to
dismiss (constructively) was reasonable will have dismissed fairly notwithstanding
that the employee is simply insisting on the terms of the contract.68 The
requirement of reasonableness is satisfied where the employer acts within the
"band of reasonable responses" which a reasonable employer might have
adopted.69 A finding that the employer has repudiated the contract becomes a
meaningless victory for the employee should the employer demonstrate that it has
behaved reasonably and for legitimate business reasons. This substantially recalls
the Michigan jurisprudence that also subordinates contractual rights to unilateral
modification for bona fide business reasons.
In English law occasional experiments with enhanced substantive controls, such as
the requirement to demonstrate that the survival of the business was at issue before
a modification in contract was enforced by dismissal,70 have not rooted
successfully. The very limited substantive limitations on the power to act in breach
of contract are that employers must not impose change for arbitrary reasons,71 and
they must demonstrate some actual and immediate business need for the change.72
However, even this possibility is somewhat weakened by the subjective standard
by which the business case  for change is judged: it is, in other words,  a matter for
the employer's honest belief that  advantages to the business  will accrue, and not a
matter for the court to examine objectively.73
 As in Michigan, the essence of the balance between efficiency and rights  lies  in
safeguards of a limited procedural rather than a substantive kind.  The employee
should be given notice of the proposed change in the contract and should be
                                                          
68  Farrant v.  The Woodroffe School [1998] IRLR 176 EAT.
69 Post Office v. Foley; HSBC Bank plc (formerly) Midland Bank v. Madden [2000] IRLR 827 CA; Iceland
Frozen Foods v. Jones [1983] ICR 17; Richmond Engineering v. Pearce [1985] IRLR 79.
70  An argument which succeeded before an Industrial Tribunal in Catamaran Cruisers Ltd v Williams but
was overruled by the EAT [1994] IRLR  386.
71  Catamaran Cruisers v. Williams, id.
72  Evans v  Elemeta Holdings [1982] ICR 323
73  Hannam v. TNT IPEC (UK) Ltd [1986] IRLR 165, at pp 167-8.
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informed that failure to accept the change will lead to dismissal.74  Time for
reflection will also be weighed in assessment of the fairness or reasonableness of
the employer's actions.75
Possible developments
It is possible that English courts might enhance the substantive controls to protect
the beneficiary of unilateral promises.  The platform for this may prove to be the
implied duty to maintain trust and confidence, the potential for which has already
been illustrated in French.  However, this Court of Appeal decision decided that,
on the particular facts, revocation was a breach of the implied term; it did not
decide that the implied term would preclude revocation in all circumstances; but,
when weighing managerial interests in securing change and the employee’s
reliance on a formal promise   it signals that significant weight will be attached to
the latter.  Indeed there are earlier dicta that reliance on a promise can, of itself, be
overriding.76
If English law chooses to develop the concept of a legitimate expectation, it may
be forced to distinguish some promises from others.  We have already argued that
the exigencies of business might afford a more persuasive case for amending or
revoking those policies that are inherently temporary. We argued that a policy
governing promotion criteria is more easily tied to its underpinning but transient
factual context than an equal opportunities policy which expresses values
transcending the shifting demands of the market place.  A legitimate expectation to
continuation of the former type of policy could not reasonably be sustained where
its underlying rationale had disappeared.  But the rationale for equal opportunities
is not so vulnerable to change.
 A distinction between revocation and revision could be significant.  Amendment
of the policy might be more acceptable if the replacement policy respected the
"core" value of non-discrimination.  In essence, the scrutiny of rationality in this
                                                          
74  RSC v. Irwin [1973] ICR 535; Bowater Containers Ltd. v. McCormack [1980] IRLR 50.
75   Bowater Containers Ltd. v. McCormack, id.
76   Jones v. Lee & Guilding [1980] IRLR 67,  per Lord Denning MR at p.69, although the  promise was not
made binding by means of the implied duty to maintain trust and confidence.
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context depends only on refinement of existing principles: a greater emphasis upon
objectivity combined with a judicial commitment to examine whether the
expectation of certain treatment may have a continuing legitimacy which in
fairness outweighs the new policy choice which threatens to frustrate it.
 Conclusion
The protection of entitlements in employment policies poses most acutely the
divergent imperatives of preserving, on the one hand, managerial prerogative and,
on the other, a respect for fairness, reliance and the security of promises.   The
English courts have responded to this by upholding one or other of these
fundamental but competing sets of values without, as yet, a developed project to
reconcile them.  The jurisprudence of the state jurisdictions in the United States
offers a more sustained and sophisticated analysis than has yet resulted in  English
law although a consistent doctrine has yet to emerge.  The Toussaint exception is
an interesting acknowledgment  that the reality in the employment relationship is
not a bilateral one: the content of the contract is in many respects itself a product
of managerial prerogative rather than the 'at-arms-length' bilateralism found in
transactional contracts.   Toussaint  offers an  alternative explanation of the
enforcement of promises which is fundamentally rooted in a theory of reliance and
not bargain.  The Arizona and Michigan models each allow employers to preserve
a power to modify or revoke the policy: in the case of Arizona this is by purely
formal means of incorporating a reservation clause into the policy itself; in
Michigan this is unnecessary for the power to revoke is inherent in the transitory
quality of the policy itself.  The difference between them is that the Arizona model
forces the employer, who has not reserved the appropriate power, to secure change
only by consent.  In Michigan change can be achieved by procedural means.
It has been argued that, if English law developed according to either one of these
two models, the result at least in the context of dismissal would not differ.  The
SOSR category of permissible dismissals ensures that even fully-fledged
contractual rights (the Arizona model) are subordinated to managerial direction
subject only to procedural protections and the limited substantive ones which
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closely echo those adopted in Michigan.   But the courts, either on the basis of
further developments in trust and confidence, or the idea of a legitimate
expectation, might develop the already-existing but minimal substantive controls to
scrutinise whether a policy commitment has a continuing legitimacy which
survives the employer’s claim that business  reasons should frustrate it.
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